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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 26, 2001, two dogs fatally mauled Diane Whipple.' A San
Francisco jury found dog owner Marjorie Knoller guilty of second-degree
2
murder, concluding she acted with implied malice. The trial court ordered a new
* Judicial Attorney, California Supreme Court, Chambers of Justice Janice Rogers Brown. This article
represents the author's personal opinion only. Special thanks are due to Richard Rochman, Blair Hoffman,
Sheila Tuller Keiter, and Akhil Amar.
1. Jaxon Van Derbeken, Unrepentant Knoller Gets Maximum Term, S.F. CHRON., July 16, 2002, at Al.
2. Id. A California defendant acts with implied malice when she acts in conscious disregard for life by
intentionally performing an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, knowing the conduct is
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trial due to the court's doubt about whether Knoller knew of the danger presented
by her dogs, and thus whether she acted with the requisite malice.3 The court had
no doubt that Knoller was guilty of at least involuntary manslaughter, which does
not require a subjective awareness of the danger presented. The perceived defect
in the initial verdict thus resembles other procedural defects that warrant a new
trial, like instructional error or juror misconduct.
In such cases, the trial has shown the defendant to be guilty of murder or
manslaughter, but not neither. Retrial is thus warranted to determine of which
offense the defendant is guilty. California, however, stands alone in prohibiting
such a second trial to determine whether the defendant is guilty of murder or
manslaughter. California law imposes on prosecutors a dilemma. They may elect
to accept the manslaughter conviction, in which case they must forfeit the right to
retry the defendant for murder, even though there may be very strong evidence of
guilt. On the other hand, the People may elect to retry the defendant for murder,
but the People must then forfeit the undisputedly valid manslaughter conviction.
The defendant thus regains the presumption of innocence, notwithstanding the
first jury's unanimous finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
guilty of some degree of homicide. Part II of this article shows this dilemma is
not compelled by the double jeopardy rule and violates its spirit. According
preclusive effect to acquittals but not valid convictions distorts the truth-finding
process and undermines the integrity of the jury system.
Not only should the People have the opportunity to retry the defendant for
the greater offense of murder without forfeiting the valid lesser manslaughter
conviction, retrial may appropriately be limited to the unresolved issue. For
4
example, in People v. Hogue, a jury convicted the defendant of penetrating a
minor with a foreign object. The Court of Appeal reversed the conviction
because the trial court had erroneously failed to instruct the jury that the
defendant needed to have been at least ten years older than the victim, a material
element of the offense.' Although the jury unanimously found beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant had committed the charged sexual act and the
only disputed issue was the age disparity, the Court of Appeal ordered a full
retrial, reinvesting the defendant with a complete presumption of innocence
life-endangering. People v. Earp, 978 P.2d 15, 53 (Cal. 1999).
3. The court's determining the verdict to be "contrary" to the evidence under section 1181 of the
California Penal Code did not preclude a new trial on double jeopardy grounds, as would a determination that
no rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty. See People v. Lagunas, 884 P.2d 1015, 1020-21
n.6 (Cal. 1994).
4. 279 Cal. Rptr. 647 (Ct. App. 1991).
5. Id. at 648. Even without resort to estoppel, the reversal was incorrect because the jury found the
requisite ten-year disparity on another count. This established, the jury necessarily determined the omitted
element against the defendant, which, according to then-prevailing California law, obviated the need for retrial.
People v. Sedeno, 518 P.2d 913 (Cal. 1974). Since Hogue, the California Supreme Court has established there is
no need for retrial when the instructional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Flood, 957
P.2d 869 (Cal. 1998).
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regarding every element.6 The Constitution does not require this result, and
common sense does not support it.
The doctrine of res judicata7 has long governed civil law, and the Supreme
Court has authorized its expansion. In upholding preclusion in a civil context, the
Court observed that relitigating proper, unanimous verdicts creates the "aura of a
gaming table."8 In Ashe v. Swenson,9 the Court ruled criminal defendants were
constitutionally entitled to the benefit of preclusion. Although the Court has not
expressly decided whether criminal convictions may likewise enjoy preclusive
effect,' it recently recognized the propriety of respecting properly returned
verdicts." Notwithstanding a limited instructional error concerning one element
of the charged offense, the Court declined to "veer away from settled precedent"
by allowing a retrial that would have erased properly returned findings of guilt."
Part III shows how precedent and policy support limiting retrials to disputed
issues.
Part IV shows how the same principles support estopping certain defenses
even where an initial verdict does not validly convict the defendant of anything.
For example, a trial court's failure to instruct the jury on self-defense may mean
that there is no lesser offense of which the defendant is necessarily guilty,
because the homicide would be justifiable if the jury accepted the self-defense
defense. If the first jury, however, unanimously rejected the defendant's
provocation defense, he should not be able to reassert it at a second trial, where
he should be limited to the defense of self-defense. Part V discusses the
exceptional cases where the People should be entitled to preclusion in subsequent
proceedings.
II. RETRIAL AND THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY RULE
The threshold issue in examining a "retain and retry" procedure (retaining
convictions for lesser included offenses (LIO's) while retrying deadlocked or
reversed greater included offenses (GIO's) is its constitutionality. For instance, if
the People retain manslaughter convictions and retry murder charges, would the
defendant be placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense? The United States
6. Hogue, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 649-50.
7. The term res judicata applies generally to the preclusive effect of judgments. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, Introduction (1982). Res judicata also applies specifically to the preclusions of
claims, which, in a criminal context, amounts to discrete criminal offenses charged. When the matter precluded
is an issue or element, the preclusion may be deemed "direct estoppel" when the preclusion occurs in the same
proceeding, or "collateral estoppel" when it occurs in a subsequent proceeding.
8. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 328 (1979) (quoting Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc.
v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971)).
9. 397 U.S. 436, 445 (1970).
10. United States v. Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d 1240, 1242 (10th Cir. 1998).
1I. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999).
12. Id. at 15.
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Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, the only federal court to address the question,
and all state courts that have conclusively decided the issue agree the procedure
comports with the Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy.
In United States v. Bordeaux,'3 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
authorized a retrial. In the defendant's first trial, the jury deadlocked on the GIO
of aggravated sexual abuse by force, 4 but convicted him of the LIO of abusive
sexual contact by force.'5 Both parties agreed the LIO conviction had to be
reversed due to instructional error, 6 but they disagreed on the retrial procedure.
While the prosecution sought to retry the deadlocked GIO charge, Bordeaux
claimed retrial could concern only the LIO, as retrial on the GIO would violate
double jeopardy principles. Bordeaux cited Green v. United States7 and Price v.
Georgia,'" where the juries convicted defendants of the LIO of second-degree
murder and left blank the verdict form for the GIO of first-degree murder."' In
those cases, the Supreme Court construed the blank forms as "implied acquittals"
of first-degree murder, barring retrial on that charge.' °
The Eighth Circuit distinguished Green and Price, where the jury expressed
no opinion on the GIO, from Bordeaux, where the jury expressly indicated its
inability to resolve the GIO charge. Treating the case as one of first impression in
the federal courts, the Bordeaux court followed two state opinions, Mauk v.
State" and People v. Fields,22 which held the Double Jeopardy Clause permits
retrying deadlocked GIO charges without disturbing the LIO convictions.
In Mauk, the initial jury deadlocked on the GIO of possession of marijuana
with intent to distribute and convicted the defendant of the LIO of simple
possession of marijuana.2' Like Bordeaux, Mauk claimed retrial on the GIO
would violate double jeopardy principles.2 The Maryland Court of Special
Appeals rejected this contention, explaining the crucial distinction between
"sequential jeopardy" and "continuing jeopardy."2
13. 121 F.3d 1187 (8th Cir. 1997).
14. Bordeaux, 121 F.3d at 1188; 18 U.S.C.A. § 2241(a)(1) (West 2000).
15. Bordeaux, 121 F.3d at 1188; 18 U.S.C.A. § 2244(a)(1) (West 2000).
16. Although the district court vacated the conviction due to instructional error and ordered a new trial,
the Eighth Circuit vacated the district court order, thereby reinstating the LIO conviction. United States v.
Bordeaux, 92 F.3d 606, 608 (8th Cir. 1996). On subsequent review, however, the Circuit agreed the
instructional error compelled reversal of the LIO. Bordeaux, 121 F.3d at 1190.
17. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
18. 398 U.S. 323 (1970).
19. Bordeaux, 121 F.3d at 1190.
20. Price, 398 U.S. at 329; Green, 355 U.S. at 190.
21. 605 A.2d 157 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992).
22. 914 P.2d 832 (Cal. 1996). The author briefed and argued the case before the California Supreme
Court.
23. Mauk, 605 A.2d at 158. In Mauk and Fields, but not Bordeaux, the LIO conviction had not been
reversed prior to appeal.
24. Id. at 159.
25. Id. at 165-70.
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Sequential jeopardy occurred in Brown v. Ohio," where a defendant pleaded
guilty to and served a sentence for the LIO of joyriding. After his release, the
prosecution charged him with the GIO of auto theft." The Supreme Court held
that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred these "successive prosecutions," which
undermined the "constitutional policy of finality for the defendant's benefit.
'28
Once the defendant's jeopardy for the charge terminated through the conviction
or plea, the Double Jeopardy Clause barred a new prosecution for the "same
offense;" a GIO or LIO.29
By contrast, a defendant faces continuing jeopardy where the prosecution
charges several offenses, resolves only some of them through an initial plea (or
jury verdict), and then continues to prosecute the unresolved charges. In Ohio v.
Johnson,3° the prosecution charged the defendant with murder, robbery, and their
respective LIO's of manslaughter and theft.3' When Johnson pleaded guilty to the
LIO's (over the prosecution's objection), the trial court dismissed the GIO's. 32 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the prosecution could proceed on the GIO's
because the termination of jeopardy on the LIO counts had no crossover effect on
other, already-charged counts.
[Johnson argues] a determination of guilt and punishment on one count
of a multicount indictment immediately raises a double jeopardy bar to
continued prosecution on any remaining counts that are greater or lesser
included offenses of the charge just concluded. We have never held that,
and decline to hold it now."
The Supreme Court distinguished Brown, where principles favoring finality
and disfavoring prosecutorial overreaching barred retrial, from Johnson, where
the prosecution did not have a full and fair opportunity to convict the defendant
of the GIO's. 4 As in Johnson, defendants who face continuing jeopardy may be
retried after mistrials or reversals on other counts.35
Like the Bordeaux court, the California Supreme Court distinguished Price
and Green, where jury silence implied acquittal on the GIO, from Fields, where
the jury convicted the defendant of the LIO (simple vehicular manslaughter while
26. 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
27. Id. at 162-63.
28. Id. at 165 (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971)).
29. Id. at 168-69. The Brown court relied on the statutory elements test of Blockburger v. United States,
284 U.S. 299 (1932), in observing that joyriding involved no elements that were not elements of auto theft. The
offenses were thus the "same," and reprosecution on the GIO was barred.
30. 467 U.S. 493 (1984).
31. Id. at 495.
32. Id. at 496.
33. Id. at 501.
34. id. at 501-02.
35. Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 152 (1970); Mauk, 605 A.2d at 170-71.
2002 / The Mauled Verdict
intoxicated) and expressly deadlocked on the GIO (gross vehicular manslaughter
while intoxicated).36 The California Supreme Court thus recognized and joined
the consensus of state courts that affirm the constitutionality of retrying GIO's
without disturbing LIO convictions." The Fields court, however, barred retrial on
state statutory grounds.38 The court decided to enforce its "acquittal-first"
doctrine, which prohibits a jury from convicting on an LIO unless it has first
formally acquitted on the GIO. In cases where the jury agrees the defendant is
guilty of the LIO but cannot agree on the GIO, the People cannot receive any
benefit from the LIO unanimity; the entire case must be retried." Where an
appellate court reverses a conviction, but recognizes the evidence nevertheless
supports the LIO, 40 the People are in a slightly better position.4 1 They have the
option of accepting the LIO conviction or retrying the GIO, but they may not do
both.4' This option resembles the 1970s game show "Let's Make a Deal," where
contestants could exchange their modest winnings for the mystery prize behind
the next curtain. California prosecutors face the same dilemma-they must trade
in valid convictions for the chance to convict on the GIO, which risks a complete
acquittal despite the first jury's conviction.43 In contrast to California and its
36. Fields, 914 P,2d at 837-38.
37. E.g., Alley v. State, 704 P.2d 233 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); State v. Rodriguez, 7 P.3d 148 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2000); United States v. Allen, 755 A.2d 402 (D.C. 2000); Bell v. State, 292 S.E.2d 402 (Ga. 1982); State
v. Klinger, 698 N.E.2d 1199 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); Commonwealth v. Pinero, 729 N.E.2d 679 (Mass. App. Ct.
2000); People v. Gonzalez, 496 N.W.2d 312 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Snellbaker, 639 A.2d 384 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1994); People v. Martinez, 905 P.2d 715 (N.M. 1995); Commonwealth v. McCane, 539 A.2d 340
(Pa. 1988). Illinois has yet to resolve the issue. Compare People v. Fisher, 632 N.E.2d 689 (I11. App. Ct. 1994),
with People v. Kettler, 446 N.E.2d 550 (I11. App. Ct. 1983).
38. Fields, 914 P.2d at 840-41. Because the only obstacle is statutory, there is room for legislative
reform.
39. People v. Kurtzman, 758 P.2d 572, 577 (Cal. 1988).
40. For instance, in In re Brown, 952 P.2d 715, 726-27 (Cal. 1998), the error invalidated the
premeditation and deliberation element and thus compelled reversal of thefirst-degree murder conviction, but a
second-degree murder conviction was still proper.
41. There is some justification for the disparate positions. In cases of appellate reversals, the LIO
conviction has been affirmed on appeal and thus tested by the appellate process, whereas there is no comparable
guarantee that the LIO conviction found by the deadlocked jury would withstand appellate review. Section 1049
of the California Code of Civil Procedure thus bars the application of res judicata on judgments that are pending
on appeal, in contrast to the national majority rule. Sandoval v. Super. Ct. of Kings County, 190 Cal. Rptr. 29,
32 n.2 (Ct. App. 1983).
42. For example, in People v. Edwards, 702 P.2d 555, 556, 562 (Cal. 1985), the jury convicted the
defendant of second-degree murder, but the California Supreme Court found the trial court should have
instructed the jury on involuntary manslaughter, of which the defendant conceded he was guilty. The court
offered the People the choice of either retrying the defendant with a complete presumption of innocence, or
accepting as final an involuntary manslaughter conviction. Id. at 562.
43. The Fields opinion creates several inconsistencies in California law by prescribing separate retrial
rules for offense-elements and sentencing enhancements. California law had recognized that prosecutors may
retry issues classified as "enhancements" (like weapon use or the infliction of great bodily injury) on which the
jury deadlocked without needing to forfeit the underlying conviction. People v. Guillen, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 653,
656-57 (Ct. App. 1994); People v. Schulz, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 269, 271-72 (Ct. App. 1992). But the very same issue
may be an element or an enhancement depending on the context. The United States Supreme Court has
therefore recognized "when the term 'sentence enhancement' is used to describe an increase beyond the
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acquittal-first procedure, the Eighth Circuit provides what may be deemed a
"verdict-first" procedure. It instructs jurors first to consider the GIO, but allows
them to convict on the LIO without necessarily deciding the GIO. "If your verdict
[on the GIO] is not guilty, or if, after all reasonable efforts you are unable to
reach a verdict, you should record that decision on the verdict form and go on to
consider whether defendant is guilty of the [LIO]."44
This verdict-first procedure enhances the very principles manifested by the
acquittal-first doctrine, which implements the "unequivocal intent of the jury to
unanimously acquit [the] defendant of the [GIO]." '45 The Eighth Circuit's rule
likewise implements a jury's intent to resolve an LIO. Under the Eighth Circuit's
balanced rule, the effect of the initial partial verdict does not depend on which
party it favors. 4'
maximum authorized statutory sentence, it is the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense than
the one covered by the jury's guilty verdict." Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 n.19 (2000). The
Apprendi court thus authorized the same trial procedures regardless of whether the Legislature had described
the fact in question as an element or an enhancement.
Premeditation is an element of first-degree murder in California but an enhancement of attempted murder.
People v. Bright, 909 P.2d 1354, 1364 (Cal. 1996). Therefore, where the jury agrees the defendant intended to
kill the victim (to support a murder or attempted murder charge) but deadlocks on whether there was
premeditation and deliberation, the People may retry the limited issue of premeditation without forfeiting the
attempted murder conviction so long as the victim survived. If the victim died, however, the People may not
retry the premeditation element of murder unless they agree to forfeit the unanimous conviction for the LIO of
second-degree (unpremeditated) murder.
Similarly, deadly weapon use during a robbery is an enhancement; deadly weapon use during an assault is
an element of aggravated assault. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 211 (West 1999 & Supp. 2002), 245(a)(1) (West
1999), 12022(b)(1) (West Supp. 2002). Thus, if the jury agrees the defendant said, "Pay up or I'll hurt you," but
deadlocks over whether he used a weapon, the weapon issue may be retried without disturbing the robbery
conviction. By contrast, if the jury agrees he said, "Shut up or I'll hurt you," but deadlocks on the weapon
question, the People must forfeit the simple assault conviction to reprosecute for weapon use. The permissibility
of retrial should not turn on the "constitutionally novel and elusive distinction between 'elements' and
,sentencing factors."' Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494; see also Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 737 (1998)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
44. Bordeaux, 121 F.3d at 1190 n.5.
45. Stone v. Super. Ct., 646 P.2d 809, 812 (Cal. 1982).
46. A close examination of Stone reveals how it distorts the truth-finding function of trials. In Stone, the
People charged defendant Stone with murder and the LIO of manslaughter. Id. The jury deadlocked, with eight
jurors voting for manslaughter and four deciding Stone committed a justifiable homicide. Id. at 813. Because all
twelve jurors agreed Stone was not guilty of murder, the California Supreme Court held a retrial could offer the
second jury only the choices of manslaughter or acquittal. The court decided to "accord the terminal effect of a
verdict to such an unequivocally expressed conclusion of a jury." Id. at 814. Although the jury failed to decide
what Stone had done (commit manslaughter or justifiable homicide), it agreed unanimously on what he had not
done; commit a murder.
By contrast, if the initial jury deadlocked between murder and manslaughter, with not one juror believing
the defendant was not guilty of homicide, the second jury would receive instruction on all three possibilities:
murder, manslaughter, and acquittal. Even though, as in Stone, the first jury had unanimously rejected one of
the three options (murder, manslaughter, acquittal), the retrying jury would still have the option of acquitting
the defendant, contrary to the first jury's findings.
Combining these trials reveals the distortion of justice. If an initial jury deadlocked between murder and
manslaughter only, the second jury would have a full choice of murder, manslaughter, and acquittal. If that
second jury deadlocked between manslaughter and acquittal, the third jury would be limited to those two
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The Fields court cryptically explained its reluctance to allow the People to
retain the LIO conviction and retry the GIO. The court cited "numerous and
formidable practical difficulties" to retrials.47 If the retrying jury is informed of
the LIO conviction, "there exists the potential for juror confusion and/or
speculation.'"' But the court also found the other alternatives less than ideal. If
instructed on only the GIO and acquittal, the jury might convict on the greater or
acquit altogether, even if it thought the middle ground was appropriate. However,
if the court instructed on the LIO, the second jury's acquitting the defendant
would arguably invalidate the prior conviction. 49 While the simple solution to the
court's doubts is to let the defense choose how to instruct the jury, since double
jeopardy is a waivable protection,"° the better approach is to inform the jury of
the prior conviction and instruct it to determine only the presence or absence of
the element that distinguishes the GIO from the LIO. Part III addresses the
constitutionality of that procedure.
III. RES JUDICATA AND PARTIAL CONVICTIONS
May res judicata protect partial convictions as it protects partial acquittals?
Mutual preclusion would provide the benefits of consistency, symmetry, and
finality that res judicata offers in civil litigation. Lower courts have divided on
the subject, which the United States Supreme Court has yet to address squarely.
This Part traces the development of this debate from the 1960s to the present and
concludes that res judicata may and ought to be applied to protect valid partial
convictions.
A. People v. Ford
A Los Angeles jury convicted William Ford of burglary, possession of a
concealable weapon by an ex-felon, first-degree robbery, kidnaping, assault with
a deadly weapon, and first-degree murder."' The California Supreme Court ruled
that an erroneous instruction regarding Ford's intoxication compelled reversal of
his first-degree murder conviction, although the court affirmed Ford's other
convictions." The trial court invoked res judicata in instructing the jury on retrial,
with the subsequent approval of the California Supreme Court:
options. The second jury's findings would thus bind the third jury's deliberations, but the first jury's findings
would not. The result is a structural preference for acquittals, which impedes the search for truth.
47. Fields, 914 P.2d at 842.
48. Id. at 842 n.5.
49. id.
50. See Paul v. Henderson, 698 F.2d 589, 592 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting United States v. Perez, 565 F.2d
1227, 1232 (2d Cir. 1977)).
51. People v. Ford, 388 P.2d 892, 895 (Cal. 1964).
52. Id.
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[On retrial, the trial court instructed] the jury, that [Ford] had been
convicted of robbery, kidnaping and possession of a concealable weapon
by an ex-felon, and reserved for the jury only the questions whether the
homicide was perpetrated during the commission of any or all of these
felonies, and whether he possessed the intent requisite to the various
felonies at the time of the commission of the homicide.53
The court barred Ford from denying any element of the felonies of which he
had been convicted by the first jury, holding their relitigation was barred by the
doctrine of res judicata. 5 The second jury could consider only those issues that
the first jury had not conclusively resolved. Accordingly, on retrial Ford could
not deny his identity as the killer; his permitted defense could concern only
timing (the homicide did not occur during his commission of the felonies),55 or
intent (he did not have the intent to commit those felonies at the time of the
56homicide). Otherwise, the People were "permitted the benefit of the felony-
murder rule without the necessity of having to prove the elements of the
respective felonies. 57
The Ford court thus announced the following rule concerning the application
of res judicata on limited retrials:
The doctrine of res judicata applies to criminal ... proceedings and
operates to conclude those matters in issue which the verdict determined
though the offenses be different. Thus where a defendant is tried on
multiple counts of a single information, each count being considered as a
separate and distinct offense, the doctrine of res judicata operates to
preclude the relitigation of issues finally determined upon retrial of only
one count. It follows that the doctrine of res judicata justifies
53. People v. Ford, 416 P.2d 132, 137 (1966).
54. Id. at 138-39.
55. California law provides the felony-murder doctrine does not apply if the felony has been completed,
or has not yet begun, at the time the fatal wound is inflicted. People v. Hayes, 802 P.2d 376, 408-09 (Cal. 1990);
People v. Gonzales, 426 P.2d 929, 932 (Cal. 1967).
56. California law provides the felony-murder doctrine applies only where the defendant has the specific
intent to commit the underlying felony. People v. Hernandez, 763 P.2d 1289, 1307 (Cal. 1988); People v. Sears,
401 P.2d 938, 943 (Cal. 1965). The felonies of kidnaping and possession of a concealed weapon by an ex-felon
required only a general intent for their commission (People v. Thornton, 523 P.2d 267, 285 (Cal. 1974); People
v. Oliver, 361 P.2d 593, 596-97 (Cal. 1961) [kidnaping]; People v. Vanderburg, 29 Cal. Rptr. 553, 557 (Ct.
App. 1963) [weapon possession]), and thus Ford's conviction did not prove that he specifically intended to
commit the felonies. On retrial, Ford could still offer evidence showing that he did not have the specific intent
to commit those felonies, and thus they could not support a conviction for felony-murder.
57. The Ford court referred to its decision in Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co. Ltd., 375 P.2d
439, 441 (Cal. 1962), where it had observed, "[sitability of judgments and expeditious trials are served and no
injustice done, when criminal defendants are estopped from relitigating issues determined in conformity with
[rigorous] safeguards." 416 P.2d at 138-39. See also People v. Super. Ct. (Scofield), 57 Cal. Rptr. 818, 823 (Ct.
App. 1967) "Once the prosecutor has convinced a trier of fact to find a certain fact (and that determination
becomes final), he should not have the burden of proving again and again that same fact in court after court."
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instructions, where relevant, that a defendant has been found guilty of
crimes finally adjudicated which are charged as elements in another
charge or charges then in the process of being retried.58
Some courts have questioned whether Ford has survived subsequent United
States Supreme Court decisions. The rest of this Part shows that Ford remains
good law and good policy, and it merits emulation.
B. Ashe v. Swenson
In Ashe v. Swenson,59 the United States Supreme Court held that the doctrine
of collateral estoppel is embodied in the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy
prohibition, by which the states are bound.60 In Ashe, several robbers robbed six
men who were playing poker.6' A jury acquitted Ashe of robbing victim Knight.62
The state then tried and convicted Ashe for the robbery of another victim,
Roberts. 63 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, finding the second
prosecution violated Ashe's constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. 64
The Court held Ashe's initial acquittal barred further prosecution. Consistent
with Ford, Ashe held the first jury's determination barred a second jury from
contradicting the first jury's judgment. "[W]hen an issue of ultimate fact has
once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be
litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit." 6 Both Ford and Ashe
thus support the rule that a legally proper and conclusive disposition may not be
challenged before another jury.
The Court's ruling in Ashe stemmed from the Court's objection to
prosecutors' treating initial prosecutions as "no more than a dry run for the
second prosecution." 6 Justice Brennan's concurring opinion amplified this
concern:
[T]he opportunities for multiple prosecutions for an essentially unitary
criminal episode are frightening.... One must experience a sense of
uneasiness with any double-jeopardy standard that would allow the State
this second chance to plug up the holes in its case. The constitutional
58. Ford, 416 P.2d at 137-38 (citation omitted).
59. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
60. Id. at 443-45. By 1970, the states were bound by the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy rule.
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). By contrast, in 1956, the Court decided a case involving nearly
identical facts as Ashe differently because the Court had not yet found this provision was part of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
61. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 437.
62. Id. at 439.
63. Id. at 439-40.
64. Id. at 447.
65. Id. at 443.
66. Id. at 447.
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protection against double jeopardy is empty of meaning if the State may
make "repeated attempts" to touch up its case by forcing the accused to
"run the gantlet" as many times as there are victims of a single episode."
Ashe enforced estoppel to benefit defendants who had successfully defended
against a charge, where the "single rationally conceivable issue," when viewed
from a "practical" and "realis[tic]" perspective, was raised anew. The Ashe
court reviewed Ashe's first acquittal, with "realism" and "rationality," and
determined the jury had concluded there was a reasonable doubt that Ashe was
one of the robbers. 69 Therefore, it would be improper to force Ashe "to 'run the
gantlet' a second time." 70
The following year, in Simpson v. Florida,7 the Supreme Court acknowledged
the doctrine did not offer symmetrical opportunities for preclusion to
72prosecutors. Prosecutors could not sequentially prosecute defendants, deriving
benefits from the verdicts returned during the first trial. If the first jury had
convicted Simpson of robbing the store manager, and the prosecution then
charged Simpson with robbing the customer, "the prosecutor could not.., have
laid the first [conviction] before the trial judge and demanded an instruction to
the jury that, as a matter of law, petitioner was one of the armed robbers in the
store that night.,
73
Some state courts have suggested that Ashe and Simpson prevent the People
from ever estopping a defendant, effectively disapproving Ford.4 The holding of
Simpson, however, was not so sweeping. The Simpson court simply held that the
People, unlike the defense, could not draw "rational" or "practical" inferences
from a verdict of guilt on a prior charge to compel a directed verdict for a
conviction on a new charge, legally distinct albeit factually related to the first.
This holding does not disturb the Ford rule that the People are entitled to verdicts
already decided in their favor.75
67. Id. at 452, 459 (Brennan, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 444-45.
69. Id. at 439, 444-45.
70. Id. at 446. "Once a jury had determined upon conflicting testimony that there was at least a
reasonable doubt that the petitioner was one of the robbers, the State could not present the same or different
identification evidence in a second prosecution for the robbery of Knight in the hope that a different jury might
find that evidence more convincing." Id.
71. 403U.S.384(1971).
72. Simpson was convicted of robbing a store manager. An appellate court reversed the conviction due
to instructional error. Id. at 384. On retrial, the jury acquitted Simpson of that robbery. He was then tried and
convicted of robbing a store customer during the same incident. Id. at 384-85. The Supreme Court held, in
accordance with Ashe, the second jury's finding that Simpson was not guilty precluded his being charged with
robbing a different victim. Id. at 385-87.
73. Id. at 386; United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 710-11 n.15 (1993).
74. People v. Goss, 521 N.W.2d 312, 320 (Mich. 1994); Gutierrez v. Super. Ct., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376,
386 (Ct. App. 1994) contra Hemandez-Uribe v. United States, 515 F.2d 20, 21-22 (8th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Colacurcio, 514 F.2d 1, 5-6 (9th Cir. 1975).
75. Ford held that if the People initially charged a defendant with the robbery and murder of victim X,
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Both Ford and Simpson are in harmony with the two imperatives established
by Ashe: (1) issues conclusively determined in a prior proceeding are not
properly subject to relitigation, 76 and (2) the People should not derive tactical
advantage from piecemeal, serial prosecutions. 77 The Supreme Court's decision
in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore78 confirmed the significance of this second
imperative, supporting the view that prosecutorial preclusion is proper when the
People bring all charges together in the initial proceeding.
C. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore
One year after Ashe, the Supreme Court expressly authorized nonmutual
estoppel. In Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois
Foundation,79 the Court approved the use of estoppel by a party that was not
involved in the initial litigation. More significantly, the Court broke further
ground in 1979 by authorizing estoppel in an "offensive"' context in Parklane
Hosiery.
Parklane Hosiery authorized the use of nonmutual estoppel against
defendants as well as plaintiffs. The Securities and Exchange Commission
brought an action in which the defendant corporation was found to have made a
materially false statement.8' After that action, a private shareholder brought a suit
alleging essentially the same claim against the corporation. The Court estopped
the defendant from denying the claim, due to the prior finding.82
The Supreme Court granted the lower courts discretion in applying offensive
estoppel due to some of the problems associated with its application. The Court's
primary concern paralleled its rationale in Ashe. Just as prosecutors might
sequentially prosecute defendants for strategic advantage, civil plaintiffs might
have a similar incentive to use offensive estoppel.
Since a plaintiff will be able to rely on a previous judgment against a
defendant but will not be bound by that judgment if the defendant wins,
and the jury convicted him of the robbery but deadlocked on murder, the People could retain the robbery
conviction against victim X. 416 P.2d at 132. Simpson held the People could not use the conviction for robbery
against X to direct a verdict in a future prosecution for the robbery of victim Y. 403 U.S. at 384. There is no
inconsistency between the two holdings.
76. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443.
77. Id. at 447.
78. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
79. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
80. As the Court explained, offensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when the plaintiff seeks to
foreclose the defendant from litigating an issue the defendant has previously litigated unsuccessfully in an
action with another party. Defensive use occurs when a defendant seeks to prevent a plaintiff from asserting a
claim the plaintiff has previously litigated unsuccessfully against another defendant. Parklane Hosiery, 439
U.S. at 326 n.4.
81. Id.at324-35.
82. Id. at 332-33.
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the plaintiff has every incentive to adopt a "wait and see" attitude, in the
hope that the first action by another plaintiff will result in a favorable
judgment .... [P]otential plaintiffs will have everything to gain and
nothing to lose by not intervening in the first action."
The Court resolved the problem by granting discretion to lower courts for
civil cases, but discretion is unnecessary in criminal cases. The Simpson rule,
which denies estoppel to prosecutors who charge the defendant in sequential
prosecutions, effectively eliminates any incentive for that practice. In United
States v. Dixon,84 the Court explained how Ashe and Simpson undermined the
incentive by describing a hypothetical in which the People charged a defendant
with murder committed during the course of a robbery and robbery with a
firearm.
[The] concern that prosecutors will bring separate prosecutions in order
to perfect their case seems unjustified. They have little to gain and much
to lose from such a strategy. Under Ashe, an acquittal in the first
prosecution might well bar litigation of certain facts essential to the
second one-though a conviction in the first prosecution would not
excuse the Government from proving the same facts a second time."
In other words, the Ashe-Simpson rule reversed the former incentive for
piecemeal litigation; the current rule effectively induces prosecutors to charge all
related offenses together.
Parklane Hosiery thus furthered the preclusion principle. So long as
plaintiffs do not engage in piecemeal litigation for tactical purposes, they are
entitled to benefit from the conclusive determinations of prior proceedings.
D. People v. Goss and United States v. Pelullo
In 1994, both the Michigan Supreme Court, in People v. Goss, 6 and the
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, in United States v. Pelullo,87
rejected the use of res judicata by the prosecution. 88 The cases involved similar
procedural predicates. In Goss, as in Ford, the first jury convicted the defendant
of robbery and murder, but the murder conviction was overturned on appeal.89 In
83. Id. at 330 (emphasis added).
84. 509 U.S. 688,710-1I, n.15 (1993).
85. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
86. 521 N.w.2d 312 (Mich. 1994).
87. 14 F.3d 881 (3d Cir. 1994).
88. That same year, the California Court of Appeal reached a similar conclusion in Gutierrez v. Superior
Court, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376 (Ct. App. 1994). After a jury convicted Gutierrez of attempted murder, his victim
died. The People then charged Gutierrez with murder. Id. at 377.
89. Goss, 521 N.w.2d at 312-13.
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Pelullo, the first jury convicted Pelullo of the substantive offense of wire fraud,
and of racketeering in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act (RICO). 9° When the racketeering conviction was overturned on
appeal, the prosecution sought to use the wire fraud conviction as evidence of a
predicate offense in the racketeering retrial.9 The Goss and Pelullo courts offered
four objections to the prosecutorial preclusion: The practice (1) undermined the
defendant's right to a jury trial, (2) undermined the second jury's opportunity to
determine all the issues, (3) restricted the defendant's ability to present his
defense, and (4) undermined the defendant's presumption of innocence. Careful
analysis reveals the flaws of these objections.
1. The Right to a Jury Trial
The Pelullo court held that estopping the defendant from disputing the
already-resolved charge would undermine his right to a jury trial. The Third
Circuit cited Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Parklane Hosiery, which asserted the
majority opinion undermined a defendant's right to a jury trial." Justice
Rehnquist's Parklane dissent, however, turned on that case's facts. The defendant
corporation never received a jury trial in either the first or second proceeding.
The first proceeding, which estopped the corporation from later asserting
innocence, was tried by the District Court.93 Justice Rehnquist expressly noted
that the use of offensive estoppel and the denial of Parklane's jury trial right were
distinct-the former could occur without the latter.94
Where a jury decides the first proceeding, there is no denial of a jury trial
right because the resolved issues have been decided by a jury. "[T]here is no
further fact-finding for the jury to perform, since the common factual issues have
been resolved in the previous action." 95 The Third Circuit dismissed this
precedent in a footnote that asserted the Supreme Court "declined to extend
Parklane to criminal cases." 9 This assertion misinterprets the Court's opinion in
Standefer v. United States,97 which limited the use of nonmutual defensive
estoppel, rather than mutual offensive estoppel.98
90. Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 885.
91. Id. at 885-86, 889.
92. Id. at 894 n.7 (citing Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 348 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
93. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 324-25.
94. "Because I believe that the use of offensive collateral estoppel in this particular case was improper, it
is not necessary for me to decide whether I would approve its use in circumstances where the defendant's right
to a jury trial was not impaired." Id. at 339 n. I (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 336.
96. Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 894 n.7 (citing Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 21-25 (1980)).
97. 447 U.S. 10 (1980).
98. Id. at 21-24.
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The prosecution charged Standefer with aiding and abetting, after the
principal had already been acquitted of the substantive offense.99 Standefer
unsuccessfully argued the prosecution should be estopped from prosecuting him
because the first jury acquitted the individual whom Standefer had allegedly
aided and abetted.
The Standefer court recalled it had authorized "nonmutual collateral
estoppel" in both Blonder-Tongue and Parklane Hosiery."°° As an aside, the
Court noted the nonmutual estoppel applied in Parklane was "offensive."'0 '
However, Standefer did not seek offensive estoppel (he sought defensive
estoppel); rather, he "urge[d] [the Court] to apply nonmutual estoppel against the
Govemment."' '° The Court distinguished Standefer from both Blonder-Tongue
and Parklane Hosiery,'°3 and rejected the "application of nonmutual estoppel in
criminal cases.'''4
In both its express holding and its reasoning, Standefer restricted the
application of only nonmutual estoppel in criminal cases. It never discussed
offensive mutual estoppel, and its analysis implicitly condoned its operation. °5
The defendant in Standefer demanded asymmetrical preclusion-acquitting a
principal would preclude prosecutions of aiders and abettors, but convictions of
principals would be immaterial in prosecutions of aiders and abettors. In
accordance with the logic of Parklane Hosiery, such a rule would both distort the
truth-finding process by offering preclusion only to pro-defense verdicts, and
offer defendants an incentive to delay their own trial to obtain a possible benefit
from their accomplice's verdict.
Accordingly, nothing in Standefer entitles criminal defendants to relitigate
offenses that have been conclusively found by a prior jury.
[W]hen a prosecutor seeks to use collateral estoppel a jury has already
passed on the defendant's claims. The fact that it was a different jury at a
prior trial does not seem to lessen the force of the contention that the
99. Id. at 11-13.
100. Id. at 21.
101. Id.
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. Although the Standefer court distinguished that case from Blonder-Tongue and Parklane Hosiery
equally, never mentioning one without the other, the Pelullo court misleadingly implied Standefer limited
Parklane Hosiery only. Pellulo, 14 F.3d at 894 n.7.
104. Id. at 23. The Standefer court's analysis showed why nonmutual defensive estoppel was
inappropriate in criminal cases. The Court observed the possibility of an erroneous acquittal, due perhaps to
jury lenity, which may not be prevented by a directed verdict, by a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or by
appellate review of the evidence. The Court perceived the danger in allowing such an erroneous verdict to
multiply by binding future juries. Id. at 22-23.
105. Id. at 21-24.
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defendant's right to trial by jury on every element of the crime has been
respected. 'o6
2. The Second Jury's Opportunity to Determine All the Issues
In Goss, the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's conviction for
robbery, but reversed his conviction for murder committed during the robbery.'o
The lead opinion considered the jury's determination of the robbery charge to be
independent of the jury finding the robbery-element of the robbery-murder.
Citing United States v. Powell" and People v. Lewis,'09 which allowed juries to
return inconsistent verdicts, the lead opinion in Goss held the retrying jury was
entitled to "[consider] afresh the armed-robbery element of the felony-murder
charge" as the first jury would have been allowed to find Goss guilty of armed
robbery, while finding the armed-robbery element of felony-murder was not
110
proven.
The opinion, however, misinterpreted Powell. The United States Supreme
Court permits juries to return inconsistent verdicts; it does not presume they will.
The Powell court recognized that the doctrine of collateral estoppel rests on the
contrary presumption-that juries act consistently. "The problem is that the same
jury reached inconsistent results; once that is established principles of collateral
estoppel-which are predicated on the assumption that the jury acted rationally
and found certain facts in reaching its verdict-are no longer useful. ' ..
The Goss court's presumption of inconsistency would thus eviscerate Ashe."2
If Ashe had been tried for both offenses in one proceeding, he could have been
convicted of robbing victim Roberts and acquitted of robbing victim Knight. " 3
The Goss court would apparently allow sequential prosecutions in which juries
could consider afresh the charges because the first jury was legally entitled to
return inconsistent verdicts. This rule would be contrary to the United States
Supreme Court's holdings in Ashe, Simpson, and Powell, which establish that the
Court tolerates inconsistency in a single proceeding but does not presume that
successive juries will reach directly contradictory results. No doctrine of
preclusion could operate if future juries are invited to consider afresh verdicts
that a former jury has properly returned.
106. In re Gutierrez, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 332, 341 (Ct. App. 1997) (Woods, J., concurring) (quoting
Comment, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 752, 763 n.68 (1961)).
107. Goss, 521 N.W.2d at 312.
108. 469 U.S. 57 (1984).
109. 330 N.W.2d 16 (Mich. 1982).
110. Goss, 521 N.W.2d at 316.
111. Powell, 469 U.S. at 68.
112. United States v. Seley, 957 F.2d 717, 723 (9th Cir. 1992).
113. Powell did not announce a new rule. It merely affirmed a longstanding principle that permitted a
single jury to return inconsistent verdicts. Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932).
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3. The Right to Present a Defense
In both Ford and Goss, the defendant had his murder conviction reversed but
his robbery conviction affirmed. An important issue in each case was how the
defendant could defend himself against the murder charge on retrial. The lead
Goss opinion distinguished Ford, finding that estoppel in Goss would bar the
defendant from asserting his preferred defense of mistaken identity; whereas
Ford was allowed to present his preferred defense that he lacked the intent to
commit the underlying felonies at the time of the homicide. But no meaningful
distinction exists. The People sought to bar Goss from offering a defense
(identity) that had been conclusively rejected by a unanimous jury, just as Ford
had been barred from offering an identity defense. Ford, however, could dispute
whether he had the specific intent to commit the felonies because the first jury
had not resolved that issue. "5
Courts must use an objective test in determining the issues subject to
estoppel, namely, those issues that were conclusively resolved by the first jury's
verdict. A subjective test, whereby estoppel is valid only where it does not
impinge upon the defendant's preferred defense, enables a defendant to veto
estoppel simply by asserting the defense that the first jury rejected.'
6
4. The Presumption of Innocence
Perhaps the strongest criticism of applying res judicata in Goss was the
concurring opinion's concern that instructing the jury "of the first jury's finding
of guilt with regard to armed robbery would unfairly prejudice the second jury's
ability to presume the defendant innocent of felony murder."'1 7 The concurring
justices feared the jury's knowledge of Goss's guilt on the robbery count would
invariably taint its consideration of the remaining murder count, of which Goss
was still presumed innocent. This knowledge, however, would impair the
presumption of innocence much less than other accepted retrial procedures.
In many jurisdictions, after a jury convicts a defendant of the highest degree
of murder, the jury must next decide the penalty. If the jury deadlocks, or has its
114. Goss, 521 N.W.2d at 320. In distinguishing Ford, the Goss court followed the analysis of the
California Court of Appeal in Gutierrez v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 386-87 (Ct. App. 1994).
115. Ford, 416 P.2d at 137. The California Court of Appeal similarly tried to distinguish Ford in
Gutierrez. The first jury convicted Gutierrez of attempted premeditated murder; after the trial, the victim died.
The Court of Appeal barred the People from using the attempted murder conviction to establish Gutierrez'
identity as the shooter on retrial. Gutierrez, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 386-87. The Court of Appeal, like the Michigan
Supreme Court, found res judicata would impinge upon Gutierrez' preferred identity defense. Id. at 385-86.
116. A better distinction between Gutierrez and Ford was available to the California Court of Appeal.
As one commentator has argued, "collateral estoppel against the accused should not be permitted when the first
trial was for a lesser offense. A defendant can hardly be expected to defend against a prosecution for assault as
vigorously as he would against one for murder." Comment, The Use of Collateral Estoppel Against the
Accused, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 523-24 (1969) [hereinafter Use of Collateral Estoppel].
117. Goss, 521 N.W.2d at 325 (Brickley, J., concurring).
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capital sentence reversed on appeal, a second jury is empanelled to decide only
the sentence. The second jury is informed of the first jury's conviction and is
instructed to decide the limited question of penalty."8 The prejudice inherent in
informing a new jury of the defendant's first-degree murder conviction exceeds
the prejudice in Goss of informing a second jury of a robbery conviction.
The sentencing determination may involve not merely the decision of
whether to extend mercy to a defendant, but may also involve specific factual
findings. For instance, if a California defendant, like Ford, is convicted of
robbery-murder, the jury must then determine whether the murder was
committed to advance the felonious purpose, or if the robbery was "merely
incidental" to the murder." 9 If the jury deadlocks in deciding whether the special
circumstance allegations are true, or has its findings overturned on appeal, the
People could retry those allegations.' 2° On retrial, the court would inform the
second jury that the defendant had been convicted of first-degree murder.'2' The
court could even inform the jury that the defendant had been convicted of the
underlying felonies. 22
This kind of instruction challenges the jury's ability to presume the defendant
innocent more than the instruction condemned by the Goss concurrence. Whereas
raising a felony to first-degree felony-murder requires the jury to find the element
of homicide, raising a first-degree felony-murder to a special circumstance
felony-murder does not require the finding of any additional act.12 Furthermore,
first-degree murder is a far more serious offense than any underlying felony, and
thus learning of a defendant's first-degree murder conviction would likely
prejudice a second jury far more than learning of his earlier robbery conviction. A
fortiori, as juries can properly follow instructions and determine a felony-murder
special circumstance allegation upon being informed of the defendant's
convictions of both first-degree murder and the underlying felony, juries may
likewise properly determine a defendant's guilt of first-degree felony-murder
upon being informed of the defendant's earlier conviction of the underlying
felony.
Courts also inform juries about defendants' underlying offenses in nonmurder
proceedings. When a jury convicts a defendant of possession of cocaine for sale,
but deadlocks on whether the amount exceeded twenty-five pounds, the court
will empanel a new jury, which will learn of the defendant's conviction and
determine only the amount possessed.'2" Similarly, when a jury agrees the
118. Green v. Zant, 738 F.2d 1529, 1542 (1 1th Cir. 1984). Holland v. State, 705 So. 2d 307, 330-31
Miss. 1997).
119. People v. Cain, 892 P.2d 1224, 1249-50 (Cal. 1995).
120. Wade v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312, 1323 n.7 (9th Cir. 1994); People v. Roy, 255 Cal. Rptr. 214, 223
(Ct. App. 1989).
121. People v. Ghent, 739 P.2d 1250, 1264 (Cal. 1987).
122. Id.
123. People v. Kimble, 749 P.2d 803 (Cal. 1988); People v. Berryman, 864 P.2d 40 (Cal. 1993).
124. See People v. Guillen, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 653, 655-57 (Ct. App. 1994) (describing an instance
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defendant committed a felony but cannot decide whether he inflicted great bodily
injury on the victim, a second jury will learn of the felony conviction and decide
only the injury issue." 5 When the second jury learns the defendant committed a
felony, it is a difference only in degree between whether that jury must decide if
the defendant committed a homicide during the felony (as in Ford or Goss) or
merely inflicted great bodily injury (as in Schulz).'26 These procedures belie the
Goss concurrence's assertion that a jury's learning of LIO convictions will
unconstitutionally erode the presumption of innocence.
Accordingly, the arguments raised by the Goss and Pelullo courts erroneously
construe the holdings of Standefer, Powell, and Ford, and overlook the general
procedures of retrials.
The Constitution guarantees the right to present a defense, to a fair trial
by an impartial jury, to the presumption of innocence, to due process,
and to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. But it does not guarantee a
defendant the right to exploit those guarantees over and over again to
determine the same issue."'
Neither constitutional principles nor public policy bars prosecutorial preclusion.
E. Neder v. United States
Nearly three decades after Ashe, the United States Supreme Court implicitly
endorsed the logic supporting prosecutorial preclusion in Neder v. United
States.'28 In Neder, the jury properly found all the elements of the charged fraud
offenses except materiality, because the trial court erroneously withdrew that
element from the jury's consideration and determined it to be true. 2 9 The
Supreme Court held that when a trial court misinstructs the jury, either by
omitting or misdescribing an element, the error is reviewable for prejudice and
does not require automatic reversal. 3° This rule exposes the weakness of
objections to res judicata for convictions.
where the defendant waived a jury trial as to the amount possessed).
125. People v. Schulz, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 269, 271-72 (Ct. App. 1992).
126. In fact, under section 12022.53 of the California Penal Code, a defendant's sentence will be
enhanced by at least twenty-five years if during the crime he shoots a firearm and either seriously injures or
kills his victim.
127. In re Gutierrez, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 341 (Woods, J., concurring).
128. 527 U.S. 1 (1999).
129. Id. at 6.
130. Id. at 13-15. The Court found such error to be reviewable for prejudice in Johnson v. United States,
520 U.S. 461 (1997). Johnson presented an easier case, as Johnson failed to object to the trial court's deciding
the element for itself. Id. at 465. Neder did object, which prompted Justice Scalia to write a concurring and
dissenting opinion, which Justices Souter and Ginsburg joined, distinguishing the two cases. Neder, 527 U.S. at
30-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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If a jury convicts a defendant of robbery, but the court fails to instruct (or
does so incorrectly) on the element that the property must be taken from the
victim's immediate presence, what should be the result? The principle
established in Ford allows a larceny conviction to stand with a retrial set to
determine only the unresolved element of personal presence."' Neder now allows
the appellate court to note the jury's verdict that reliably found a larceny and then
review the record and determine that no reasonable jury could have failed to find
the immediate presence element."' If an appellate court may examine the
evidence and decide for itself what a reasonable jury would have found, a
fortiori, there can be no objection to a new jury's examining the evidence and
finding the existence of the element for itself.'33
The Neder court alluded to the significance of preclusion, acknowledging the
defendant had no constitutional right to relitigate issues that an earlier jury had
properly and conclusively determined against him. If only the materiality element
had not been properly decided, Neder did not deserve a retrial on the elements
that the jury had properly determined.
Reversal without [harmless error analysis] would send the case back for
retrial-a retrial not focused at all on the issue of materiality, but on
contested issues on which the jury was properly instructed. We do not
think the Sixth Amendment requires us to veer away from settled
precedent to reach such a result. 4
Neder therefore broke new ground in rejecting the view that the Constitution
or policy entitles defendants to relitigate questions already resolved by another
jury.
F. Conclusion
In Ford, the California Supreme Court approved the use of res judicata in
criminal cases "to preclude the relitigation of issues finally determined" in an
earlier proceeding." The logical force of that holding has only grown over time.
The U.S Supreme Court has since issued several decisions that have furthered the
131. Larceny is an LIO of robbery, which requires the defendant take the property from the immediate
presence of the victim. As many prosecutors explain to juries, if someone steals your pants, it's larceny; if you
are wearing them at the time, it's robbery.
132. The Neder court applied the test described in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967),
determining whether "it appears 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to
the verdict obtained."' Neder, 527 U.S. at 15 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).
133. As the Court has since observed, "there is a vast difference between accepting the validity of a prior
judgment of conviction entered in a proceeding in which the defendant had the right to a jury trial and the right
to require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and allowing the judge to find the required
fact ... " Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496.
134. Neder, 527 U.S. at 15 (emphasis added).
135. Ford, 416 P.2d at 138.
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 33
preclusive effect of former verdicts. In Ashe, it held that defendants were entitled
to the preclusive effect of earlier acquittals as a constitutional imperative. In
Blonder-Tongue and Parklane Hosiery, the Court authorized preclusion even in
the absence of mutuality. Parklane Hosiery held that defendants as well as
plaintiffs could be bound by prior judgments, so long as the precluding party had
not failed to join an earlier action for tactical reasons. Finally, Neder allowed
appellate courts to decide the existence of elements on which there had been
incomplete or imperfect instruction, undermining objections to juries' performing
that function themselves. The Neder court expressly decided defendants had no
Sixth Amendment right to relitigate issues properly decided by an earlier jury.
Reciprocal res judicata both comports with constitutional norms and enhances the
integrity of the jury system.
IV. PRECLUDING DEFENSES
Part III examined the subject of precluding defendants from disputing
findings that they had committed lesser offenses. A problem that occurs
frequently, however, is that a first jury may find only certain elements, which do
not constitute a complete offense. For instance, a murder conviction cannot stand
if the court erroneously fails to instruct the jury on self-defense, and a rape
conviction cannot stand if the jury receives no instruction regarding consent. The
omitted instruction negates the existence of any "settled precedent" for
conviction. This Part examines the proper procedures when an initial trial fails to
resolve conclusively the initial charges.
In People v. McCoy, 36 the jury convicted the defendant of first-degree
murder, but the trial court failed to instruct the jury correctly on the mitigating
ground of "imperfect" self-defense."' Because the jury received instruction on
reasonable self-defense and the jury declined to find the homicide was justifiable,
there could be no challenge to the conclusion that the defendant was guilty of
homicide. The only unresolved question was whether the defendant was guilty of
first-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter by operation of the imperfect self-
defense doctrine. After twelve jurors had unanimously found that the defendant
committed an unjustifiable homicide, there is no reason to allow him to dispute
either his identity as the killer or the reasonableness of the killing. Although the
appellate court"' remanded by offering the People a choice of accepting a
voluntary manslaughter conviction or retrying the defendant with a complete
136. 24 P.3d 1210 (Cal. 2001).
137. Id. at 1212. The California Supreme Court first recognized the defense of "imperfect self-defense"
in People v. Flannel, 603 P.2d I (Cal. 1980). The Flannel court held a defendant who killed with an actual but
unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense did not act with malice and was thus guilty of only
manslaughter. Id.
138. The Court of Appeal remanded on this basis. People v. McCoy, 93 Cal. Rptr. 827, 841-42 (Ct. App.
2000). The Supreme Court reviewed the case for another issue, and declined to review the Court of Appeal's
conclusion. People v. McCoy, 24 P.3d 1210, 1213 (Cal. 2001).
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presumption of innocence, my proposed estoppel of defendant is consistent with
the California Supreme Court's decision in the People v. Christian S. 39
The Court's reasoning in Christian S. shows that a defendant may dispute
only those issues that were not conclusively resolved in the first proceeding. A
trial court found Christian guilty of second-degree murder. 40 It was unclear,
however, whether the trial court was aware that Christian would be guilty of only
voluntary manslaughter if he killed under the actual but unreasonable belief that
the killing was necessary for his self-defense. The Supreme Court thus could not
determine whether the trial court decided that imperfect defense did not apply as
a matter of fact, meaning Christian was guilty of murder, or as a matter of law,
meaning Christian might have been found guilty of only voluntary manslaughter
if the court had been aware of the defense's possible application. Because of the
trial court's uncertainty on the law, the case resembled one where the jury was
not properly instructed on the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court, with instructions to
enter its factual finding of whether the defendant killed with an actual belief in
the need for self-defense. 14' The remand signaled two available options: Christian
could be guilty of murder or manslaughter. Any "instructional" uncertainty
concerned the limited issue of malice. Because the trial court determined that the
defendant committed an unjustified homicide, there was no need to retry the
issues of the reasonableness of the self-defense or Christian's identity as the
killer.
The limited scope of the remand was possible because it was a court trial and
the trial judge was still alive. But the correct resolution of a case ought not
depend on such fortuitous circumstances. If the range of proper outcomes
encompasses second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter, the defendant
does not deserve a retrial in which complete acquittal is an option. A limited trial
error should not provide an unlimited reversal.
Not only should the first trial narrow the range of offenses available, it
should also narrow the range of available defenses. If a conviction for murder
cannot stand only because the jury was not instructed on imperfect self-defense,
there is no reason to instruct the jury on heat-of-passion voluntary manslaughter
if the first trier of fact rejected that alternative.
Retrials should be limited to retry only unresolved questions, even where
there is no offense of which the defendant stands properly convicted. For
instance, if a jury convicts a defendant of murder, but the trial court fails to
instruct the jury correctly on reasonable self-defense, the defendant cannot be
deemed guilty of any charge, because reasonable self-defense supports a
139. 872 P.2d 574 (Cal. 1994). The Christian S. court held the doctrine of imperfect self-defense
remained viable after the state Legislature amended section 28 of the California Penal Code to abolish the
"diminished capacity" defense.
140. Id. at 575-76.
141. Id.at583-84.
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complete acquittal. Nonetheless, there is no reason to allow the defendant to
dispute identity on retrial. In People v. Anderson, 42 the defendant was tried and
convicted for forcible rape; the jury determined that the victims did not consent
to the sexual acts. The conviction was overturned because the jury was not
instructed on the defense of reasonable belief in consent. 43 The retrying jury
should therefore have been instructed on the reasonable belief defense. But as the
first jury properly determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Anderson had
engaged in sexual intercourse with the minor victims and did so without their
actual consent, there was no reason to offer Anderson an opportunity to impeach
the first jury's verdict by disputing either identity or actual consent on retrial."44
"Defense preclusion" involves the same constitutional and policy issues as
the "offense preclusion" discussed in Part III. Part III showed that where a jury
properly found all the elements of first-degree murder except premeditation, a
second jury could learn of the prior conviction, and decide only the premeditation
element. By parallel logic, where a jury finds all the elements of murder, except
the absence of self-defense, it is proper to allow a new jury to decide only that
limited issue and preclude its consideration of other defenses.
141
The cases discussed in Part IV involved a retrial where all charges were
brought in the initial proceeding. The holdings of Simpson'46 and Dixon14'7 appear
to preclude such collateral estoppel when the People have not brought all
available charges in the first proceeding. Part V suggests the possibility of
several exceptions to the general rule depriving the People of the benefits of
preclusion in sequential prosecutions.
V. FACT PRECLUSION IN SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS
In Dixon, the Supreme Court explained that prosecutors may not use verdicts
from former proceedings to estop defendants in subsequent proceedings. This
rule effectively enforces the policy of deterring sequential prosecutions for
tactical advantage.' 4 The rule, although generally correct, should be subject to
exceptions in cases where the People could not bring all charges together. Such
142. 192 Cal. Rptr. 409 (Ct. App. 1983).
143. Id. at 414. See, e.g., People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337 (Cal. 1975), which held a defendant who
engages in sexual intercourse while reasonably but incorrectly believing in the victim's consent is not guilty of
rape.
144. Because Anderson had not testified at his first trial (Anderson, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 411), the People
would be unable to impeach him on retrial if he denied committing the acts.
145. If anything, such a retrial is even less susceptible to constitutional objection than the retrial
approved in Ford. The People retain the burden of proving the homicide beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas a
defendant may bear the burden of proving an affirmative defense such as self-defense. Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S.
228, 233-36 (1987).
146. 403 U.S. at 386.
147. 509U.S. at710-11 n.15.
148. Id.
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inability may result from either (1) the defendant's request for separate
proceedings, or (2) the subsequently-charged crime's lack of completion at the
time of the first prosecution. In these circumstances, because the People are not
engaging in sequential prosecution for tactical advantage, the Simpson bar should
not apply.
A. Bifurcation
One circumstance that might justifiably excuse the People for not bringing all
charges together is the defense's request for separation. One case where this
occurred, State v. Ingenito,49 served as perhaps the most persuasive authority to
the courts in Goss'50 and Pelullo5' and thus warrants careful analysis.
The prosecution charged Ingenito with, inter alia, unlicensed transfer of a
weapon and possession of a weapon by a convicted felon.'52 Ingenito successfully
requested that the charges be bifurcated so the jury would not learn of his
convicted felon status before deciding the unlicensed transfer charge. 3 After the
jury convicted Ingenito of the unlicensed transfer, the prosecution proceeded
with the possession by a convicted felon charge. The prosecution relied on
Ingenito's unlicensed transfer conviction to prove the possession element. The
New Jersey Supreme Court held this reliance violated Ingenito's right to a fair
trial.""
The Ingenito court relied on the "pronounced and preeminent" responsibility
of the jury'55 in holding that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial "ordinarily
includes the right to have the same trier of fact decide all of the elements of the
charged offense."'56 Such construction of the Sixth Amendment is no longer
tenable in light of Neder. The Neder court ruled that, where the instant jury found
true all the alleged elements except one, the reviewing court could examine the
record and decide for itself that undetermined element.5 7 A fortiori, there can be
no constitutional objection to allowing that element to be conclusively
determined by another jury.""
149. 432 A.2d 912 (N.J. 1981).
150. 521 N.W.2d 312, 313, 317 (Mich. 1994).
151. 14 F.3d 881,892, 896 (3d Cir. 1994).
152. Ingenito, 432 A.2d at 913.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 919.
155. Id. at 916.
156. Id. at 919.
157. Neder, 527 U.S. at 9-10.
158. The Ingenito court's asymmetrical reasoning led the court to cite Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S.
390 (1932) for the proposition that "we accept inconsistent verdicts that accrue to the benefit of a defendant."
Jngenito, 432 A.2d at 916. As the Supreme Court explained in reaffirming Dunn, such inconsistent verdicts are
accepted regardless of whether they accrue to the benefit of the defense or prosecution. Powell, 469 U.S. at 65.
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When the Superior Court's Appellate Division reviewed the case, Justice
Morgan's concurring opinion correctly observed that the defendant was not
entitled to a second jury determining the same issue, whether he possessed a
weapon, which the first jury had determined against him.
There can be no doubt but that the first jury concluded beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant actually or constructively possessed the
weapons he was found guilty of having transferred. I see no reason in
law, constitutional or statutory, or in considerations of policy, why a
defendant should be entitled to a second jury determination of this same
issue .... It makes little sense to conclude ... that in all such bifurcated
cases the second trial must be a plenary one in every sense. Defendant
cannot contend that he was denied a jury trial with respect to the issue of
his possession."'
Justice Morgan correctly realized Ingenito did not deserve to have multiple
determinations to provide him with "one fair jury to find [Ingenito possessed the
weapon] and another fair jury to find he did not."' 0
Such multiple determinations provide the same benefits as sequential
prosecutions provided to the prosecution in Ashe, or to the plaintiffs through the
holding of Parklane Hosiery. Under the logic of Ingenito, defendants would be
wise to divide the prosecution into as many stages as possible. "Since a
[defendant] will be able to rely on a previous [acquittal] ... but will not be bound
by [a guilty verdict], the plaintiff has every incentive" to bifurcate.'
61
Furthermore, the defense will enjoy the tactical advantage, found improper in
Ashe, of seeing the People's case in a "dry run" for the subsequent prosecution.
Justice Morgan's concurring opinion correctly observed the distinction
between the defendant's right to bifurcate the proceedings and his right to
invalidate a properly returned jury verdict. In a prosecution for unlicensed
transfer, Ingenito's prior conviction was immaterial, and therefore prejudicial.
Ingenito was entitled to have the prosecution proceed first in deciding the
unlicensed transfer charge. By contrast, in the second prosecution for possession
by a convicted felon, the unlicensed transfer was not immaterial; it was an
already-proven element of the offense.
B. Incompletion
The other context where collaterally estopping defendants is proper is where
the offense of which the prior conviction is an element was not completed at the
time of the prior conviction. For instance, the concurring opinion in Goss
159. State v. Ingenito, 405 A.2d 418, 422 (N.J. App. Div. 1979) (Morgan, J., concurring).
160. Gutierrez, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 391 (Woods, J., dissenting).
161. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 330.
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observed that collateral estoppel had been approved in many cases where the
defendant's status was in issue.' Such status could be either alienage'63 or
patemity.'6 In such cases, earlier proceedings determined that the defendant was
either not a citizen of the United States or was the father of the subject minor.
The subsequent prosecution was brought when the alien/father committed an act
or omission (entering the United States without proper documentation or failing
to provide for the child) that was criminal due to the defendant's status. The
unlawful-entry or failure to provide charge, however, could not be brought before
the criminal act or omission, although the status had already been determined.
Prosecutors are also unable to bring charges of recidivism against defendants
when they are convicted of earlier crimes that serve as the predicate for findings
of recidivism. 65 Therefore, when a defendant is convicted of a crime in 1989, he
may not relitigate the validity of the conviction the following year when the
People seek to use the prior conviction to enhance his sentence upon conviction
of a subsequent crime.66
A third example of where the People are unable to bring all charges
simultaneously is when the victim dies after the initial prosecution. In
Commonwealth v. Evans,167 a defendant's assault conviction barred him from
asserting self-defense when he was charged with manslaughter after the victim
died. In Carmody v. Seventh Judicial District Court,'68 the defendant's former
conviction for robbery barred him from denying such conduct when he was tried
for the victim's subsequent death.'9
The strongest argument against allowing such exceptions to the general rule
against preclusion in subsequent prosecutions is that defendants may have an
insufficient motive to defend against the initial charges when the stakes are
relatively small. "A defendant can hardly be expected to defend against a
prosecution for assault as vigorously as he would against one for murder."' 70
162. Goss, 521 N.W.2d at 325-26 n.8 (Brickley, J., concurring).
163. United States v. Bejar-Matrecios, 618 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1980); Hernandez-Uribe v. United States,
515 F.2d 20 (8th Cir. 1975); Pena-Cabanillas v. United States, 394 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Rangel-Perez, 179 F. Supp. 619 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
164. State v. Braskett, 162 N.E.2d 922 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959); People v Mojado, 70 P.2d 1015 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1937); Commonwealth v. Ellis, 35 N.E. 773 (Mass. 1893).
165. State v. Kelly, 942 P.2d 579, 586-87 (Kan. 1997).
166. Id. at 587.
167. 101 Mass. 25 (1869).
168. 398 P.2d 706 (Nev. 1965).
169. Id. at 707 (dictum). The California Court of Appeal held otherwise in Gutierrez v. Superior Court,
29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376 (1994). Gutierrez, like Goss, held preclusion would improperly limit the defendant's
choice of his defense, thereby allowing the defendant unilaterally to defeat the application of estoppel against
him. See supra Part III.D.3.
170. Use of Collateral Estoppel, supra note 116, at 523-24. The defendant's expectations also support
limiting the estoppel effect of guilty pleas. Because the plea's purpose is to effect an agreement between the
parties, it violates the "meeting of the minds" to use a plea to a lesser offense, which the defense offers to
resolve the charges, to convict the defendant of a greater charge. It may also deter defendants from pleading
guilty. United States v. Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d 1240, 1243-46 (10th Cir. 1998).
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Simpson generally bars the People from estopping defendants in subsequent
criminal proceedings. The contexts of bifurcation and incompletion, however, do
not involve the use of preclusion for tactical advantage. Because the People are
unable to bring all charges together, the general reason for barring such collateral
estoppel is not present.
VI. CONCLUSION
The process of ascertaining truth must be a two-way street. 7 ' Res judicata
principles hold that a party that has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate a
claim or issue is not entitled to relitigate merely because the verdict is
unfavorable. 72 This principle applies in criminal as well as civil proceedings.'73
Parties are not deprived of procedural protections when they are precluded from
relitigating positions already rejected in prior civil proceedings; the same logic
applies when defendants enjoy in their initial proceedings the greater protections
offered in criminal cases. 74
United States Supreme Court decisions of the past generation have properly
expanded the preclusive effect of judgments, applying the principle to protect
criminal acquittals in Ashe and to protect plaintiff victories in Parklane Hosiery.
Their reasoning supports extending the doctrine to protect partial criminal
convictions, as the California Supreme Court did in Ford.
In the Knoller case, the jury's verdict established that Marjorie Knoller is
certainly guilty of criminal homicide-at least manslaughter and possibly
murder. Because the issue of Knoller's subjective awareness of the danger
presented by her dogs (and thus malice) remains unresolved, a second jury
should have the opportunity to resolve it. Both a retrial for murder and the
present manslaughter conviction are valid, and the People should not be
compelled to forfeit one to obtain the other.
The current asymmetrical application of preclusion, which operates to
memorialize acquittals but never convictions, distorts the truth-ascertainment
function of trials. The legitimacy of a verdict cannot depend on its content.
Defendants have the right to reverse a judgment where there is demonstrable
error. The People have a reciprocal right to preserve a judgment where there is
none.
171. See Prudhomme v. Super. Ct., 466 P.2d 673, 675 (Cal. 1970) (discussing how discovery is a
valuable tool in ascertaining the truth).
172. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS, Introduction (1982).
173. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 104 n.22 (1980); Emich Motors Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 340
U.S. 558, 568 (1951).
174. United States v. Beaty, 245 F.3d 617, 624 (6th Cir. 2001).

